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Background: Depressive thoughts are known to persist in persons with depressed mood leading to ru-
mination and exacerbation of depressive symptoms. What has not yet been examined is whether this
persistence of depressive thoughts can lead to impairment of working memory (WM).
Methods: We assessed whether receiving a WM task featuring depressive cues could bias performance
on a subsequent, non-depressive WM task for dysphoric individuals (DIs) compared to non-DIs.
Results: DIs showed signiﬁcantly attenuated performance on the WM task with depressive cues com-
pared to non-DIs. Further, when DIs were given the WM task with depressive cues ﬁrst, they showed
deﬁcits on a second WM task without depressive cues, compared to DIs given the non-depressive WM
task ﬁrst and non-DIs in either condition.
Limitations: Unselected recruitment procedures did not permit balanced sample sizes in each group.
Future research is needed to assess whether these results extend to a clinically depressed sample and
whether WM deﬁcits are the consequence of depressed mood, or a risk factor for the development and
maintenance of depressed mood.
Conclusions: Results suggest that, for DIs, the inﬂuence of depressive cues on performance transfers to
subsequent tasks in which these cues are no longer present. These results support the hypothesis that
when depressive thoughts are part of depressed persons’ conscious experience, cognitive deﬁcits arise.
Further, these results suggest an ecologically-relevant mechanism by which day-to-day cognitive deﬁcits
in depression can develop.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Intrusive, negative, and depressive thoughts are a ubiquitous
part of everyday life for persons with depressed mood (see Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2008). Thus, it is intuitive that depressed mood is
associated with greater time spent on processing negative or de-
pressive information, relative to other forms of information (e.g.,
Joormann, 2004, 2010; Joormann and Gotlib, 2008; Lyubomirsky
et al., 2003; Koster et al., 2010; Levens and Gotlib, 2010; Siegle
et al., 2002). Greater time spent on this information, to the neglect
of rehearsing goal-relevant information in working memory, has
been hypothesized to underlie day-to-day cognitive deﬁcits in
persons with depressed mood (Hubbard et al., 2015). Thus, an
important step in understanding cognition in persons with de-
pressed mood lies in examining how and when working memoryB.V. This is an open access article u
in Sciences, Center for Brain
ockingbird Lane, Dallas, TX
.A. Hubbard).might fail.
Working memory is a fundamental cognitive process which
allows one to keep information “online” in an easily-accessible
state, during concurrent processing of other information. This
process is thought to underlie most higher-order cognitive abilities
(e.g., decision making and reasoning) and predicts many ecologi-
cally-relevant behaviors (see Engle, 2010). For example, reading a
paragraph requires that a reader must store semantic information
from text they just read; and use this information to disambiguate
subsequent text (Daneman and Carpenter, 1980).
It is known that dysphoric individuals (DIs) have deﬁcits in
working memory compared to non-DIs when depressive cues are
present (Hubbard et al., 2015). For example, prior research in our
laboratory used a modiﬁed working memory span task wherein
DIs and non-DIs were required to remember lists of numbers (i.e.,
goal-relevant information) while also responding to depressive
cues (i.e., D-span task; Hubbard et al., 2015). Results from this
study showed that DIs had signiﬁcantly decreased ability to re-
member the goal-relevant information compared to non-DIs when
the depressive cues were present. This effect was not due tonder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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similar amounts of goal-relevant information when non-depres-
sive cues were present within a standard working memory span
task. This result suggests that DIs have selective deﬁcits in working
memory capacity. What remains unknown is whether such de-
pressive cues can exert deleterious effects on working memory,
after the cues are no longer present.
Evidence suggests that the processing of emotional and self-
relevant information occurs for an extended period for persons
with depressed mood, and can interfere with cognitive perfor-
mance (e.g., Hertel, 1998; Lyubomirsky et al., 2003). For instance,
Lyubomirsky et al. (2003) asked DIs and non-DIs to concentrate on
self-focused, emotion-focused, and symptom-focused thoughts
(rumination condition), or to concentrate on neutral thoughts
unrelated to themselves or emotion (neutral condition). After
these induction phases participants completed a series of aca-
demic tasks (e.g., reading text, watching a lecture, proofreading).
DIs in the rumination condition reported more task-unrelated
thoughts and showed reduced performance on the academic tasks
compared to DIs in the neutral condition, and non-DIs in either
condition. These results suggest that prior processing of person-
ally-relevant and emotional cues can have adverse effects on DIs'
future cognitive performance. This affective transfer from initial
cueing to subsequent task performance, is similar to the proactive
transfer observed in skill learning (e.g., Verneau et al., 2015).
In the current study, we assessed whether the presence of a
working memory task with depressive cues (D-span; Hubbard
et al., 2015) could result in decreased performance on a sub-
sequent working memory task without depressive cues (i.e., a
reading span task [R-span; Conway et al., 2005; Daneman and
Carpenter, 1980; Unsworth et al., 2005]) for DIs compared to non-
DIs. Speciﬁcally, we administered both the D-span and R-span
tasks, back-to-back, to DIs and non-DIs, and manipulated the order
in which these tasks were given. That is, D-span then R-span (D–R)
or R-span then D-span (R–D). Consistent with the notion of an
affective transfer mechanism, we hypothesized that DIs in the D–R
condition would perform signiﬁcantly worse on the R-span task
compared to DIs in the R–D condition and non-DIs in either
condition.2. Method
2.1. Participants and procedure
Eighty-three unselected (i.e., not prescreened) university un-
dergraduate students were recruited for the current study. Five
participants did not complete the depression inventory in its en-
tirety, one did not complete the rumination scale in its entirety,
and two did not complete the working memory tasks in their
entirety. We limited our analyses to participants who completed
the protocol (N¼75). Participants were compensated with course
credit in their undergraduate psychology courses. All procedures
were approved by the governing Institutional Review Board.
Study procedures were similar to those described in Study 3 of
Hubbard et al. (2015). However, the work presented here was part
of a novel experiment. Consistent with our prior work, partici-
pants received subjective report measures, R-span and D-span
tasks, as well as a ﬂuid reasoning task. Inconsistent with Hubbard
et al. (2015), the present study asked participants to complete the
R-span and D-span tasks back-to-back, to assess whether receiving
the D-span task ﬁrst could affect performance on the R-span task
for DIs compared to non-DIs.
Participants received study components in the following order:
the subjective report measures, the ﬂuid reasoning task, and the
working memory tasks. The order of the working memory taskswas counterbalanced across participants, leaving approximately
half of participants receiving the affective task variant ﬁrst (D–R
condition; n¼39; nnon-DI¼21) and the other half receiving the
non-affective task ﬁrst (R–D condition; n¼36; nnon-DI¼24).
Because unselected sampling methods do not necessarily per-
mit proportional assignment to random conditions, all group dis-
tributions were scrutinized for homogeneity of variance violations.
When necessary for parametric testing, degrees of freedom were
adjusted using the Welch procedure to accommodate unequal
variance between groups. Mixed effects models were also utilized,
which are robust to deviations from such assumptions and to
smaller sample sizes (e.g., Gupta et al., 2006).
2.2. Measures
2.2.1. Center for epidemiological studies depression inventory (CESD)
Participants completed the CESD (Radloff, 1977). This self-re-
port inventory was designed to assess signiﬁcant depressive
symptomology in the general public, with an emphasis on the
affective component of depression (i.e., depressed mood; Radloff,
1977). The CESD asks responders to report on their depression-
related thoughts, feelings, and actions within the week prior to
taking the test. The CESD was not intended to diagnose major
depressive disorder, but was designed to classify those with sig-
niﬁcant depressive symptoms (i.e., DIs) in the general population.
We utilized the score suggested by Radloff (1977) to classify DIs
(i.e., CESD score415) and non-DIs (i.e., CESD scorer15). This
procedure classiﬁed 30 participants as dysphoric (nDI¼30 [39.5%])
and 45 participants as non-dysphoric (nnon-DI¼45 [60.5%]).
2.2.2. Ruminative responses scale (RRS)
Participants also completed the RRS (Treynor et al., 2003). This
self-report scale was designed to assess how often responders
used speciﬁc rumination strategies when coping with negative
mood (Treynor et al., 2003). We used this measure to ensure that
DIs in each condition did not signiﬁcantly differ in their tendencies
for rumination.
2.2.3. Raven's advanced progressive matrices (RAPM)
This test is designed to measure inductive reasoning ability
with novel content (Raven et al., 1998). Each of the questions
consists of a series of geometric patterns that change along rows
and down columns. The bottom right pattern is always missing,
and the participant's task is to choose the correct response of eight
to complete the pattern. The score reﬂects the number of correct
items out of a possible 36. RAPM has been shown to be associated
with a variety cognitive abilities (e.g., Marshalek et al., 1984), and
thus it is often used as a measure of general ﬂuid intelligence (cf.
Carpenter et al., 1990). This measure was utilized to ensure that
our groups did not differ in general ﬂuid ability.
2.3. Working memory tasks
2.3.1. Affective working memory task (D-span)
The D-span task is a computer administered, complex span
measure that assesses participants' ability to encode, maintain,
and subsequently retrieve varying loads of goal-relevant in-
formation, in spite of interference from depressive cues (Hubbard
et al., 2015). In this task, participants were asked to respond
“TRUE” or “FALSE” regarding whether or not a sentence was in-
dicative of their recent thoughts, feelings, and behaviors (i.e., the
interference task). Interference sentences were based on self-re-
ferential, mood items adapted from depression inventories (Beck
et al., 1996; Radloff, 1977; Rush et al., 2003). For example, one
interference sentence read, “I am sad all of the time.” All sentences
were unique and probed thoughts, feelings, or behaviors related to
I am sad all of the 
time.
This is a way I feel or have 
felt recently.
True False
7
Interference Sentence
Interference Response
Storage Stimulus
Select the numbers in the order presented. 
Use the blank button to fill in forgotten 
numbers. 
1
2
3
4
5
6
1 7
8
9
0
clear Exit
7
Recall Grid
blank
George comet a tall 
man.
This sentence makes sense.
True False
7
Interference Sentence
Interference Response
Storage Stimulus
Fig. 1. (A) Example of one-item set on the D-span task. (B) Example of one-item set on the R-span task.
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depressive-relevant or depressive neutral. Depressive-relevant
endorsements were those typical of depressive thoughts. For ex-
ample, a response of “True” to the sentence “I am sad all of the
time,” or “False” to the sentence “People generally like me” would
be coded as depressive-relevant. Depressive-neutral endorse-
ments were given a score of one and depressive-relevant were
given a score of zero. Scores were summed for each participant
with lower values representing more depressive-relevant re-
sponding. Response time was also collected for each sentence.
Participants practiced the interference sentences for ﬁve trials.
During this time, average response time was gathered and parti-
cipants were told that during the actual task if they exceeded this
time (by þ2.5 SD) their current trial would be skipped and they
would not receive credit for that trial. This procedure was utilized
so as to minimize the use of strategic rehearsal procedures (e.g.,
Unsworth et al., 2005).
Within the actual task, after a participant responded to an in-
terference sentence, he or she was instructed to remember a
number (i.e., the goal-relevant stimulus; numbers 0–9). This pro-
cess of responding to an interference sentence and encoding a
goal-relevant stimulus continued three to eight times depending
on load size (i.e., load sizes 3–8). There were three trials for each
load size presented in random order (18 total trials). At the end of
each trial, participants were asked to recall numbers from the
encoding portion of the trial, in the order the numbers were
presented. A trial was considered accurate if all numbers were
recalled in the order presented; these accurate trials were given
credit proportional to the load size of the trial (Conway et al.,
2005; Daneman and Carpenter, 1980). For example, for a load size
of three, if the participant remembered all three goal-relevant
stimuli in the order presented, their score for that trial would be
three points; if they did not remember all three goal-relevant
stimuli in the order presented they would receive zero points for
that trial. Overall working memory performance was evaluated by
the summation of each of these load-weighted trials (Conwayet al., 2005; Daneman and Carpenter, 1980).
2.3.2. Reading span task (R-span)
The computer administered R-span task (Kane et al., 2004;
Unsworth et al., 2005) was built on the same program shell as the
D-span task. Thus, goal-relevant stimuli, instructions for recall, and
scoring procedures were equivalent to those used in the D-span
task. The difference between the R- and D-span tasks was the
interference cues. For the R-span task, participants were asked to
make a judgment on the semantic sensibility of a non-affective
sentence. Participants responded “TRUE” or “FALSE” to a prompt
reading, “This sentence makes sense.” For example, one non-
sensical sentence read, “George comet a tall man,” whereas one
sensible sentence read, “It was a clear and starry night” (Fig. 1B).
Each response to these interference sentences was scored as either
correct (1) or incorrect (0). Interference scores were summed for
each participant and percent accuracy was calculated. Both groups
in each condition scored signiﬁcantly above chance response rates
(i.e., 50 %; all means482% accuracy, p's4 .001; see Supplementary
Material for expanded analyses and discussion). Response time
was also collected for each interference sentence. Working mem-
ory performance was evaluated in this task by the summation of
load-weighted, accurate trials (Conway et al., 2005; Daneman and
Carpenter, 1980). To remain consistent with the D-span task, no
trial was discarded due to incorrect interference sentence re-
sponding on the R-span task. Sentence length of the interference
stimuli was equivalent across R- and D-span tasks (p4 .05).3. Results
3.1. Sample characteristics, subjective reporting and ﬂuid reasoning
performance
DIs did not signiﬁcantly differ from non-DIs in age (MDI¼22.30
[SE¼1.04] vs. Mnon-DI¼22.76 [SE¼ .85], t(73)¼–.34, p¼ .734) or sex
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1.32, p¼ .251). Further, groups did not signiﬁcantly differ in their
reporting of race/ethnicity (i.e., African/African American
[DI¼6.67% vs. non-DI¼11.11%], Hispanic [DI¼30.00% vs. non-
DI¼17.78%], Indian or East Asian [DI¼43.33% vs. non-DI¼22.22%],
Middle Eastern [DI¼3.33% vs. non-DI¼2.22%], Non-Hispanic
Caucasian [DI¼16.67% vs. non-DI¼42.72%], or Other [DI¼0.00%
vs. non-DI¼4.44%]), Pearson χ2 (5)¼9.27, p¼ .10. DIs had sig-
niﬁcantly higher CESD scores (MDI¼26.77 [SE¼1.48]) than non-DIs
(Mnon-DI¼8.33 [SE¼ .70]), t(42.09)¼11.28, po .001. DIs also had
signiﬁcantly greater RRS scores (MDI¼54.50 [SE¼2.28]) than non-
DIs (Mnon-DI¼40.73 [SE¼1.71]), t(73)¼4.92, po .001. DIs did not
differ signiﬁcantly from non-DIs on RAPM performance
(MDI¼20.43 [SE¼1.15] vs. Mnon-DI¼20.67 [SE¼ .82]), t(73)¼ .17,
p¼ .866.
Because we sought to assess possible differences between DIs
receiving the affective working memory task ﬁrst (D–R condition)
and those receiving the non-affective working memory task ﬁrst
(R–D condition), we also tested for possible differences in sample
characteristics, subjective reporting, and RAPM performance be-
tween these groups. DIs in the D–R condition did not differ sig-
niﬁcantly from DIs in the R–D condition on age (MD–R¼21.67
[SE¼1.33] vs. MR–D¼23.25 [SE¼1.62], t(14.02)¼-.66, p¼ .522) or
set (R¼72.22% female vs. R–D¼58.33% female, Pearson χ2
(1)¼ .625, p¼ .429). Further, these groups did not signiﬁcantly
differ in their reporting of race/ethnicity (i.e., African/African
American [R¼11.11 % vs. R–D¼0.00%], Hispanic [D–R¼38.89% vs.
R-D¼16.67%], Indian or East Asian [D–R¼38.89% vs. R–
D¼50.00%], Middle Eastern [D–R¼0.00% vs. R–D¼8.33%], Non-
Hispanic Caucasian [D–R¼11.11% vs. R–D¼25.00%]), Pearson χ2
(4)¼5.06, p¼ .282. These groups also did not differ in CESD scores
(MD–R¼25.50 [SE¼2.47] vs. MR–D¼27.61 [SE¼1.86], t(28)¼ .69,
p¼ .493), RRS scores (MD–R¼52.58 [SE¼4.25] vs. 55.78 [SE¼2.59],
t(22.96)¼1.29, p¼ .203), or RAPM performance (MD–R¼22.25
[SE¼1.85] vs. MR–D¼19.22 [SE¼1.44], t(28)¼ .68, p¼ .501).
3.2. Interference sentence responding
We sought to assess whether DIs and non-DIs differed in re-
sponding on the D-span and R-span tasks. As expected, DIs
(MDI¼53.80 [SE¼3.96]) responded to the D-span interference
sentences in a signiﬁcantly more depressive manner compared to
non-DIs (Mnon-DI¼79.87 [SE¼2.04]), t(44.28)¼-5.85, po .001. DIs
(MDI¼83.11% [SE¼ .01]) and non-DIs (Mnon-DI¼83.20% [SE¼ .01])
did not signiﬁcantly differ in their number of correct responses on
the R-span interference sentences, t(73)¼ .07, p¼ .948.
DIs (MDI¼1025.08 [SE¼40.01]) did not signiﬁcantly differ in
their response time on the D-span interference sentences com-
pared to non-DIs (Mnon-DI¼949.52 [SE¼50.13]), t(73)¼1.09,
p¼ .281. DIs (MDI¼798.75 [SE¼37.24]) and non-DIs
(Mnon-DI¼768.42 [SE¼30.41]) did not signiﬁcantly differ in their
response time on the R-span interference sentences, t(73)¼ .63,
p¼ .531.
We also assessed these measures for DIs in the D–R and R–D
condition. DIs in the D–R condition (MD–R¼56.33 [SE¼5.15]) did
not differ signiﬁcantly from DIs in the R–D condition (MR–D¼50.00
[SE¼6.31]) on D-span interference sentence responding, t
(28)¼ .78, p¼ .443. Further, DIs in the D–R condition
(MD–R¼83.33% [SE¼ .02]) did not signiﬁcantly differ from DIs in
the R–D condition (MR–D¼82.78% [SE¼ .02]) on the number of
correct responses on the R-span interference sentences, t
(28)¼ .22, p¼ .828. These groups also did not signiﬁcantly differ
in D-span interference sentence response time (MD–R¼1028.95
[SE¼52.55] vs. MR–D¼1019.27 [SE¼64.37]), t(28)¼ .12, p¼ .908;
nor did they signiﬁcantly differ in R-span interference sentence
response time (MD–R¼783.62 [SE¼47.65] vs. MR–D¼821.44[SE¼69.69]), t(20.75)¼ .45, p¼ .659.
These results showed that responding on the D-span task was
consistent with dysphoria status; that is, DIs responded more
depressive-relevant than non-DIs. Further, DIs in both conditions
responded similarly to these sentences. These results showed that
participants were responding to the D-span interference stimuli in
a mood-congruent manner. These results also showed that both
DIs and non-DIs were placing similar emphasis on responding
accurately to the interference sentences on the R-span task. These
effects were similar for DIs in both conditions. Taken together with
the relative equivalence between groups in response times on
both tasks, it is likely that all groups placed similar emphasis on
reading, comprehending, and responding to the interference sen-
tences (see Supplementary Material).
3.3. Group, task, and condition effects on working memory
performance
To assess the effect that dysphoria status and task order had on
working memory performance, we used mixed-effects general
linear modeling to assess the effects of Group (DI, non-DI), Task
(D-span, R-span), and Condition (D–R, R–D) on the number of
items recalled in each working memory task.
There were no signiﬁcant Task, Condition, GroupCondition,
TaskGroup, TaskCondition effects (all p's4 .05). There was,
however, a signiﬁcant effect of Group, F(1,71)¼6.02, p¼ .017,
.08p
2η = and a signiﬁcant GroupTaskCondition interaction, F
(1,71)¼4.52, p¼ .037, .06p2η = (Fig. 2A).
The main effect of Group revealed that DIs (LSM¼44.73
[SE¼2.90]) had overall lower scores on both working memory
tasks compared to non-DIs (LSM¼53.86 [SE¼2.33]). However, this
effect was inﬂuenced by the Group TaskCondition interaction.
Decomposing this interaction by Group, there were no effects of
Task, Condition, or TaskCondition on working memory perfor-
mance for non-DIs (all p's4 .05). Also, there were no effects of Task
or Condition on working memory performance for DIs (all
p's4 .05). However, for DIs, there was a signiﬁcant TaskCondi-
tion interaction, F(1,28)¼4.69, p¼ .039, .14p2η = , indicating that
the change in working memory performance from one task to the
next was inﬂuenced by Condition. A follow-up test revealed that
DIs in the R–D condition showed a signiﬁcant increase in perfor-
mance from the D-span task to the R-span task, compared to DIs in
D–R condition (MR–D¼7.58 [SE¼5.07] vs. MD–R¼6.39
[SE¼4.05]), t(28)¼2.16, p¼ .039, d¼ .80. Assessing working mem-
ory by Group showed that, consistent with our prior results, DIs
remembered fewer items on the D-span (LSM¼44.43 [SE¼3.30])
compared to the non-DIs (LSM¼53.57 [SE¼2.64]), t(73)¼2.31,
p¼ .024, d¼ .56 (Fig. 2B). Assessing this effect using pairwise
comparisons on Condition did not reveal signiﬁcant differences
between DIs in the R–D condition and DIs in D–R condition, nor
non-DIs in the R–D condition and non-DIs in D–R condition (all
p's4 .05). DIs remembered fewer items on the R-span (LSM¼45.03
[SE¼3.30]) than non-DIs (LSM¼54.16 [SE¼2.64]), t(73)¼2.44,
p¼ .017, d¼ .57. However, assessing Group by Condition on the
R-span task (Fig. 2C) indicated that the Group effect for working
memory performance on the R-span task was driven by DIs in the
D–R condition, F(3, 71)¼4.54, p¼ .006, .16p2η = . Consistent with
our hypothesis, Fig. 2C illustrates that DIs in the D–R condition
performed worse than non-DIs in both conditions (all p'so .05).
Also consistent with our hypothesis, DIs in the D–R condition also
performed worse than DIs in the R–D condition (po .05). DIs in
the R–D condition performed similarly to non-DIs in both condi-
tions (all p's4 .05).
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We investigated whether depressive cueing could have en-
during, adverse effects on DIs' working memory performance. We
hypothesized that if affective transfer was occurring from the
D-span (depressive cues) to the R-span task (non-depressive cues),
we would observe decreases in performance on the R-span task for
DIs who received the D-span task ﬁrst (i.e., D–R condition), com-
pared to DIs in the R–D condition or non-DIs in either condition.
Our results supported this prediction. Importantly, baseline
changes to working memory capacity were not a factor for DIs in
either condition; it was observed that DIs in the R–D condition
performed similarly to non-DIs on the R-span task, and that DIs in
the D–R condition performed similarly to DIs in the R–D condition
on the D-span task. Further, the present results were consistent
with our previous work showing that DIs in both conditions per-
formed worse than non-DIs on the D-span task (Hubbard et al.,
2015).
Our ﬁnding, that exposure to depressive information can pro-
duce enduring deﬁcits in working memory for persons with de-
pressed mood, suggests implications for the nature of cognitive
deﬁcits in depression. In a previous study we showed distinct
deﬁcits in working memory performance for DIs compared to non-
DIs on the D-span task, but not on the R-span task (Hubbard et al.,
2015). The present study extended these results by showing that
deﬁcits in DIs' working memory performance were not merely
task-speciﬁc; rather, their working memory performance was ad-
versely affected after depressive cueing. This result suggests that,
for persons with depressed mood, depressive cues are maintained
after cueing is removed. For these individuals, more time spent
attending to depressive cues in working memory could result in
decay of goal-relevant information and decreased performance on
the D-span task (Hubbard et al., 2015). Here we have shown that
this processing insufﬁciency for goal-relevant information may
extend to working memory deﬁcits when external cues are no
longer present.Affective transfer and processing insufﬁciency are com-
plementary mechanisms by which cognitive deﬁcits could arise in
the day-to-day lives of persons with depressed mood. Environ-
mental and internal cues that trigger depressive thoughts do not
occur in the real world with the same systematic repetition as they
often do in laboratory tasks. However, our results suggest that,
despite the intermittent occurrence of depressive cues in the real
world, their effect might endure over time. This affective transfer
from a previous cue to current cognitive processes could lead to
insufﬁcient processing of ongoing tasks and goals, loss of this in-
formation in working memory, and broad-spread deﬁcits in cog-
nitive ability for persons with depressed mood (cf. Engle, 2010).5. Limitations
The present study has two limitations pertaining to sample
selection. The ﬁrst is that the unselected sampling procedure did
not permit a balanced design. Thus, the DI groups were smaller
than the non-DI groups. A second limitation is in the general-
izability of DI samples to those with clinical depression. It is pos-
sible that dysphoric samples represent a milder form of depressed
mood. Thus, future work is needed to explore the extent to which
the present results extend to a clinically depressed population.
One could also ask whether the observed deﬁcits in working
memory for DIs are the consequence of their depressed mood, or a
risk factor for the development and maintenance of depressed
mood (cf. Demeyer et al., 2012; De Lissnyder et al., 2011). For ex-
ample, Joormann et al. (2007) assessed whether children at high-
risk for developing depression showed information processing
biases for negative information. These researchers showed that,
compared to children at lower-risk levels, those at high-risk for
depression spent more time attending to negative information and
less time attending to positive information. A similar risk-based
sampling procedure might be employed with the present para-
digm to assess whether the results observed here are the
N.A. Hubbard et al. / Journal of Affective Disorders 190 (2016) 208–213 213consequence of depressed mood, or a possible marker for de-
pressed mood, which could lend support for a novel en-
dophenotype in depression (see Gottesman and Gould, 2003;
Gotlib et al., 2006).6. Conclusions
The present work demonstrates that depressive cues can have
persistent effects on DIs' working memory. Future work should
assess under which conditions affective transfer can be mitigated
and whether therapeutic or training techniques might be em-
ployed to reduce this effect. Our results support the notion that
when depressive thoughts are part of conscious experience, cog-
nition is adversely affected for persons with depressed mood.Appendix A. Supplementary material
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in
the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2015.06.056.References
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